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Abstract
This paper builds a Ricardian-Chamberlinian two-country model with
heterogeneous firms in a monopolistically competitive sector in which every
new entrant faces increasing fixed costs of production. There are efficiency
gaps between countries in marginal and fixed costs and a country unilaterally
imposes an import tariff. It is shown that an increase in tariff increases the
number of firms of the tariff imposing country while decreases the number
of firms of the tariff-imposed country, possibly reverting the position of net
exporter of varieties. A tariff is detrimental to the tariff-imposed country. A
small tariff may be beneficial to the tariff-imposing country.
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1 Introduction
The literature on trade that takes into account firm heterogeneity has been flour-
ishing lately, especially after the path-breaking work of Melitz (2003). It is ex-
pected that the opening of an economy to trade reallocates firms in the market
since in the real world production technologies possessed by firms differ within and
across industries. In such cases, the evidence provided by empirical studies is that
more efficient firms would survive -and even expand in scale- whereas less efficient
firms would be driven out of the market unless they raise productivity. As a result,
trade liberalization would raise overall productivity. Recent developments on gen-
eral equilibrium models of trade have started to provide the analytical apparatus
to fill the gap between empirical observation and theory.
In this context, extensions of the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman love-of-variety ap-
proach1 have proved to be fairly tractable in offering a justification for the ex-
istence of firms with different productivity levels. Melitz (2003) focus on the
forward-looking behavior of the firm under productivity uncertainty and analyzes
the impact of trade liberalization on the productivity of firms and their realloca-
tion in the market. In a Chamberlinian-Ricardian model with cost heterogeneity
and transport costs, Venables (1987) develops a theory of trade to explain the
presence of firms with varying market shares and the effects of industrial policy.
The model considers asymmetric preferences over differentiated products, which
also plays a role in determining market shares.2 Similar to marginal costs, hetero-
geneous fixed costs may be important factors determining industrial reallocations.
That is the focus of Kikuchi and Shimomura (2007), who analyzes the effects on
trade patterns caused by efficiency gaps in fixed costs between countries.
This note aims to clarify the role of tariffs as industrial policy when firms in the
same sector feature heterogeneity in fixed costs and there is efficiency gap between
countries. In a Ricardian-Chamberlinian setting, a two-country-two-sector model
is built with one country unilaterally imposing an import tariff. It concludes that,
1See Helpman and Krugman (1985).
2Similarly, Montagna (2001) extends the D-S-K model to allow for different love-of-variety lev-
els. She clarifies how productivity heterogeneity leads to a endogenous determination of industry
efficiency.
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a tariff increase always increase the number of firms of the tariff-imposing country
while decreases the number of the tariff-imposed country, with the possibility of
reverting a country’s position of net exporter of differentiated to net importer.
Also, it concludes that tariffs, when small, are beneficial to the tariff-imposing
country and always detrimental to the tariff-imposed country.3 This paper pro-
vides a tractable model of monopolistic competition that includes heterogeneity
of firms, positive profits and trade barriers, which enables further policy-related
analyses on, for instance, trade agreements, multinational firms and other related
issues without losing one important feature: simplicity.
The next section develops the model, comparative statics are performed in
Section 3, Section 4 discusses trade policy, Section 5 discusses the effects of tariffs
on welfare, and the last section concludes this work.
2 The Model
In this section the basic trade model is developed so as to include fixed cost het-
erogeneity, efficiency gaps between countries and tariff, while keeping tractability.
There are two countries, Home and Foreign. They are identical in terms of
consumers’ preferences and factor endowments but may differ in production tech-
nologies. Labor is the only factor of production and is employed in the two sectors
of the economy: a constant-returns competitive sector producing a homogeneous
product and a monopolistically competitive sector producing a large number of
differentiated products. The competitive sector is large and the homogeneous
good is taken as numeraire.
Consumers have preferences denoted by the following utility function U :
U = ²−1D² + Y, 0 < ² < 1, (1)
where ² is a parameter, D is the quantity index of the monopolistically competitive
sector and Y is the consumption level of the numeraire good. This specification
3Tariffs also represent an important source of revenue for some countries. It is well known
that a small positive tariff can be welfare-enhancing even in a competitive market setting. See
Helpman and Krugman (1989) for example.
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implies that differentiated products are not subject to income effects. Demands
for differentiated products are derived from consumer’s preferences and follow the
Dixit-Stiglitz specification. Then the quantity index takes the CES form
D =
(
n∑
k=1
(di)θ +
n∗∑
k=1
(di∗)θ
) 1
θ
, 0 < θ < 1, (2)
where n is the number of differentiated products produced at Home (Foreign), di
is the demand for product i, and 1/(1−θ) is the elasticity of substitution between
every pair of products. Foreign variables and coefficients are indicated with (∗).
The price index takes the form
P =
(
n∑
k=1
(pi)θ/(θ−1) +
n∗∑
k=1
(pi∗)θ/(θ−1)
)(θ−1)/θ
, (3)
where pi is the price of the i-th differentiated product produced at Home and pi∗
is the price of the i∗-th differentiated product produced at Foreign.
The utility maximization problem is solved in two steps. First, by minimizing
the cost of attaining a given value of the quantity index D the following demands
are derived:
di = (pi/P )1/(θ−1)D, i = 1, ..., n, (4)
di∗ = (pi∗/P )1/(θ−1)D, i∗ = 1, ..., n. (5)
In the second step consumers maximize utility by dividing income between differ-
entiated and homogeneous products. Then we obtain
D = P 1/(²−1). (6)
Combining (4), (5) and (6) we obtain the following Home demand functions for
the Home-produced differentiated product i and Foreign-produced differentiated
4
product i∗:
di = (pi)1/(θ−1)
(
n∑
k=1
(pk)θ/(θ−1) +
n∗∑
k=1
(pk∗)θ/(θ−1)
)(θ−²)/[θ(²−1)]
(7)
di∗ = (pi∗)1/(θ−1)
(
n∑
k=1
(pk)θ/(θ−1) +
n∗∑
k=1
(pk∗)θ/(θ−1)
)(θ−²)/[θ(²−1)]
. (8)
Note that if ² > θ differentiated products are complements, thus we assume ² < θ.
Turning to the supply side, firms in the monopolistically competitive sector
faces intraindustry heterogeneity in fixed costs, with firm i at Home facing a
fixed cost α(i) and firm i∗ at Foreign facing the fixed cost α∗(i∗). There is also
international asymmetry in marginal costs with β for Home firms and β∗ for
Foreign firms. With a sufficiently large number of firms, the elasticity of demand
for each product becomes 1/(1− θ).
In order to verify the effects of trade barriers in a simplified way, we assume
that Home unilaterally imposes a uniform import tariff τ to Foreign differentiated
products.4 From the assumption of symmetry in marginal costs of differentiated
products, consumer’s prices at Home for Home-produced and Foreign-produced
differentiated products become, respectively,
pi = β/θ, pi∗ = (1 + τ)β∗/θ,
and consumer’s prices at Foreign for Home-produced variety i and Foreign pro-
duced variety i∗ become
p∗i = β/θ, p
∗
i∗ = β
∗/θ.
Note that firms price at a markup over their marginal costs and tariffs.
Rearranging β∗ = aβ, when n firms are active at Home and n∗ at Foreign
the summation of equation (3) takes the following form for Home and Foreign,
4Bilateral trade imposition can also be considered. Note, however, that our simplification does
not change the qualitative results of the model.
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respectively:
n∑
k=1
(pk)θ/(θ−1) +
n∗∑
k=1
(pk∗)θ/(θ−1) =
(β
θ
) θ
θ−1 [n+ n∗(1 + τ)
θ
θ−1a
θ
θ−1 ] (9)
n∑
k=1
(p∗k)
θ/(θ−1) +
n∗∑
k=1
(p∗k∗)
θ/(θ−1) =
(β
θ
) θ
θ−1 [n+ n∗a
θ
θ−1 ]. (10)
It is clear that the assumption of asymmetry in fixed costs of firms producing
differentiated products plays a crucial role in determining profits. For the sake
of simplification, let the efficiency ranking in fixed costs assume the form α(i) =
µi for Home firms and α∗(i∗) = µ∗i∗ for Foreign firms, implying that the firm
with the lowest index is the most efficient.5 Under this assumption firms of the
same country have equal revenues from both markets but have different fixed
costs. Then, the profit functions pii and pii∗ for firm i at Home and i∗ at Foreign,
respectively, can be calculated using equations (7),(8), (9) and (10) and the pricing
rule:6
pii = (pi − β)di + (p∗i − β)d∗i − µi
= (1− θ)
(β
θ
) θ
θ−1
[(β
θ
) θ
θ−1
(
n+ n∗(1 + τ)
θ
θ−1a
θ
θ−1
)] θ−²
θ(²−1)
+ (1− θ)
(β
θ
) θ
θ−1
[(β
θ
) θ
θ−1
(
n+ n∗a
θ
θ−1
)] θ−²
θ(²−1) − µi (11)
pii∗ = (pi∗(1 + τ)−1 − β∗)di∗ + (p∗i∗ − β∗)d∗i∗ − µ∗n∗
= (1− θ)(1 + τ) 1θ−1
(β∗
θ
) θ
θ−1
[(β
θ
) θ
θ−1
(
n+ n∗(1 + τ)
θ
θ−1a
θ
θ−1
)] θ−²
θ(²−1)
+ (1− θ)
(β∗
θ
) θ
θ−1
[(β
θ
) θ
θ−1
(
n+ n∗a
θ
θ−1
)] θ−²
θ(²−1) − µ∗i∗. (12)
The number of firms is endogenously determined via free entry and exit. Note that
the larger the firm index the larger the fixed cost, thus firms in both countries
stop entering the market when profits break even. In this setting firm i can
5The asymmetry in fixed costs can be interpreted as differences coming from different man-
agement skills. For example, suppose there is a ranking of competency of CEOs. Or, assume
that each firm entering the market faces a higher fixed cost to develop a product different from
those already in the market, that is, the cost of differentiation is higher for subsequent firms.
6We normalize Home and Foreign labor endowment to 1.
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supply the same quantity as the break even firm n so as to earn positive profits
pi(i) = µn− µ(i). Thus, the free entry conditions pii = 0 and pii∗ = 0 imply7
(1− θ)
(β
θ
) θ
θ−1
[(β
θ
) θ
θ−1
(
n+ n∗(1 + τ)
θ
θ−1a
θ
θ−1
)] θ−²
θ(²−1)
+ (1− θ)
(β
θ
) θ
θ−1
[(β
θ
) θ
θ−1
(
n+ n∗a
θ
θ−1
)] θ−²
θ(²−1) = µn (13)
(1− θ)(1 + τ) 1θ−1
(β∗
θ
) θ
θ−1
[(β
θ
) θ
θ−1
(
n+ n∗(1 + τ)
θ
θ−1a
θ
θ−1
)] θ−²
θ(²−1)
+ (1− θ)
(β∗
θ
) θ
θ−1
[(β
θ
) θ
θ−1
(
n+ n∗a
θ
θ−1
)] θ−²
θ(²−1) = µ∗n∗. (14)
Equations (13) and (14) can be used to construct loci in n, n∗ space with the
number of Home firms decreasing to the number of Foreign firms and vice versa
since dn(n
∗)
dn∗ < 0,
d2n(n∗)
dn∗2 > 0,
dn∗(n)
dn < 0, and
d2n∗(n)
dn2
> 0. Figure 1 denotes the
two loci with equilibrium in the intersection of the two curves.8 Note that the
curves approach the axes asymptotically.
n
n∗
pin = 0
e
O ne
n∗e
pin∗ = 0
n[n∗=0]
n∗[n=0]
Figure 1: Equilibrium Loci
7Note that under this setting there will always be active firms in both countries since the first
firm will have null fixed costs.
8Note that it is possible to calculate the number of firms when there is no active firms in the
other country:
n[n∗=0] =
"
2(1− θ)
µ
“β
θ
” ²
²−1
# θ(1−²)
2θ−θ²−²
n∗[n=0] =
"
[(1 + τ)
²
²−1 + 1](1− θ)
µ∗
“aβ
θ
” ²
²−1
# θ(1−²)
2θ−θ²−²
.
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The equilibrium number of firms is given by ne at Home and n∗e at Foreign.
According to the shape and the magnitude of the asymmetry in costs and the
tariff level, the equilibrium point may have its position changed considerably and
so do trade patterns. In the next section we perform some comparative statics.
3 Comparative Statics
In order to see the effects caused by heterogeneity of costs, our comparative statics
analysis starts with our benchmark case with free-trade and symmetric costs. With
identical countries, there are no differences in marginal costs (a = 1), no differences
in the fixed cost coefficient (µ = µ∗) and Home does not impose any import tariffs
(τ = 0). In this case, prices do not differ nor there are technological gaps between
countries. Then the shape of the curves will be symmetric and the number of
firms of Home and Foreign will be equal. The equilibrium point e of Figure 1 will
lie on a 45-degree line that passes through the origin.
Now suppose that Foreign firms have lower productivity in terms of marginal
costs, that is, they have higher marginal cost than Home firms (a > 1). From (13)
and (14), it is clear that dn/da > 0 and dn∗/da < 0. In that case, both loci will
shift as shown in Figure 2 such that the equilibrium point changes to e′.
n
n∗ pin = 0
e
ne
′
n∗e′
pin∗ = 0e′
45◦
Figure 2 - Efficiency Gap (a > 1)
From our calculations it is clear that the Home marginal firm curve rotates
to the right while the Foreign marginal firm curve shifts down. Now Home has a
larger number of firms compared to the previous equilibrium and Foreign a smaller
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number. A higher productivity in terms of marginal costs of Home firms implies
in lower prices, higher demand and thus, a larger number of Home firms.
Now turn to the case of international differences in fixed costs. Suppose Home
has now a smaller fixed cost coefficient than Foreign (µ < µ∗). A small decrease
in µ shifts only the Home zero-profit curve outwards as shown in Figure 3.
n
n∗
pin = 0
e
ne
′
n∗e′
pin∗ = 0
e′
45◦
Figure 3 - Difference in Fixed Costs (µ < µ∗)
Higher fixed cost coefficient implies in lower profits for any firm in Foreign when
compared to Home firms. Note in Figure 3 that the initial equilibrium has Foreign
as the net exporter of differentiated products since the equilibrium point is located
above the 45-degree line. That may be the case Foreign firms have lower marginal
costs than Home firms. Nevertheless, an improvement in the efficiency in fixed
costs of Home firms can revert this position such that at equilibrium e′ Home is now
the net exporter of differentiated products, even if Home firms had a disadvantage
in marginal costs. The efficiency o fixed costs predominate as a determinant of
trade, contrary to the prediction based in comparative advantage on prices only.9
4 Trade Policy
Trade policy has long been used as a means to promote national industry. Tariffs
may have the detrimental effect of raising prices but also the positive effect of rais-
ing tariff revenues and allowing national industry to take advantage of economies
of scale. In this section we analyze the effects of tariff changes on the industrial
structure of countries.
9See Venables (1987) and Kikuchi and Shimomura (2006) for similar results.
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From (13) and (14) we find that an increase in tariffs shifts Home locus outward
and Foreign locus inward (Figure 4). Since tariffs raises the price of Foreign goods,
Home firms are able to obtain a larger share of the domestic market and the
number of Home firms increase whereas the number of Foreign firms decreases.
Proposition 1. An increase in tariff imposed by Home increases the number of
Home firms and decreases the number of Foreign firms.
Figure 4 illustrate the case which Foreign has a larger number of firms than
Home (n∗e > ne) before tariff rises. Thus Foreign is the net exporter of differenti-
ated products. Note that after the tariff increase, Home becomes the net exporter
(ne
′
> n∗e′) of differentiated products.
n
n∗
pin = 0
e
pin∗ = 0
45◦
e′n∗e′
ne
′
Figure 4 - Tariff Increase (τ > 0)
Here again we have a case in which the rise in tariff shifts the Home’s position of
net importer to net exporter of differentiated products.10
5 Welfare Analysis
This section examines the effects of tariffs on welfare. In order to simplify our
analysis, we do not add tariff revenues to Home income but that does not change
the qualitative results of our analysis. Under these assumptions, the welfare of
representative consumers of Home and Foreign can be denoted by the following
10Note that he imposition of a tariff has the effect of allowing more inefficient firms into the
market.
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indirect utility functions:
V =
(1− ²
²
)
P (
²
²−1 ) + 1 +
µn2
2
(15)
V ∗ =
(1− ²
²
)
P ∗(
²
²−1 ) + 1 +
µ∗n∗2
2
. (16)
The last item of the RHS of each equation denotes total profits of domestic firms.
Note that total utility will be negatively affected by an increase in the price index
since it lowers the demand for differentiated products. On the other hand, utility
will be positively affected by an increase in the number of Home firms since profits
necessarily increase. The effects of an increase in tariff imposed to Foreign prod-
ucts is dubious since it may increase the price index but, at the same time, increase
Home profits. The overall effect depends on the magnitude of the tariff and the
parameter conditions. Thus, when an increase in tariff sufficiently increases the
number of Home firms or does not change the price index, there is the possibility
that Home welfare increases.
We illustrate this possibility with a symmetric case. Suppose Home and For-
eign are identical countries. Then under free trade the number of Home and
Foreign firms is the same (nF = n∗F ). A positive tariff increases the number of
Home firms and decreases the number of Foreign firms. We denote the number
of Foreign firms as a fraction δ of Home firms under a positive tariff τ , that is,
n∗t = δ(τ)nt with δ(τ) < 1. Then from (3), (13) and (14) we otain the ratio of
the price index and the under a positive tariff, P t, and under free trade, PF :
P t
PF
=
(
(1− θ)(1− δ)4
(1− θ)− (1− θ + τ)(1 + τ) 1(θ−1)
× 1
1 + δ(1 + τ)
θ
(θ−1)
) (1−²)(1−θ)
2θ−θ²−²
. (17)
Equations (15) and (16) indicate that there are unambiguous welfare gains
Home and welfare loss for Foreign when P t/PF ≤ 1 since a positive tariff raises
total profits at Home and the price index does not increase. We prove now that
under certain conditions that will be the case. Notice that the last item of equation
(17) is clearly smaller than one. And, as (1− θ)− (1− θ + τ)(1 + τ) 1(θ−1) > 0 for
a positive tariff τ , we verify that the first item is smaller than one if δ > 3/4 no
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matter the level of tariff that induces such level of δ. Thus, small tariffs, which
imply high values of α, may increase the number of firms, and consequently profits,
without increasing the price index.11 This result is summarized as follows:
Proposition 2. A small tariff is beneficial to the tariff-imposing country.
From the same argument, we can argument that complete trade liberalization
may be harmful.
A model with bilateral tariff imposition could easily be set up and tariffs could
be interpreted as iceberg costs, for example. We point out that possible extensions
of the model can include heterogeneity in marginal costs, a three-country setup
that allows us to perform trade policy analysis in free trade agreements, or a
framework with multinational firms, without losing tractability.
6 Concluding Remarks
This note built a two-country-two-sector model with heterogeneous firms in the
differentiated goods sector, new entrants face increasing fixed costs in the differ-
entiated products sector. There are technological differences between countries.
The model provides a very tractable framework to deal with firm heterogeneity
and reallocation in the market in the presence of tariffs. We found that when
Home unilaterally imposes a tariff to Foreign products the number of Home firms
increases, while the number of Foreign firms decreases. At Home, more firms will
enter the market while more efficient firms will gain higher profits. At Foreign,
less efficient firms will be driven out of the market while the remaining firms will
face lower profits. Also, there exists the possibility that an increase in tariffs raises
Home welfare by increasing the number o firms - and consequently, total profits -
and decreasing the price index.
The introduction of cost heterogeneity allows firms to have positive profits with
the marginal firm being reallocated according to changes in tariff and other pa-
rameters. A tariff increase may benefit a country but at the cost of allowing more
11Notice that welfare gains would be even higher have we considered tariff revenues. Moreover,
the range for the level of a beneficial tariff may be even larger since welfare losses from increased
tariffs can be offset by gains in profits.
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inefficient firms (in terms of fixed costs) to enter the market. Trade liberalization
can be detrimental to a country while efficiency gains are always beneficial.
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